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In recent publications, the authors have considered inverse statistics of the Dow Jones Industrial
Averaged (DJIA) [1, 2, 3]. Specifically, we argued that the natural candidate for such statistics is
the investment horizons distribution. This is the distribution of waiting times needed to achieve a
predefined level of return obtained from detrended historic asset prices. Such a distribution typically
goes through a maximum at a time coined the optimal investment horizon, τ∗ρ , which defines the most
likely waiting time for obtaining a given return ρ. By considering equal positive and negative levels
of return, we reported in [2, 3] on a quantitative gain/loss asymmetry most pronounced for short
horizons. In the present paper, this gain/loss asymmetry is re-visited for 2/3 of the individual stocks
presently in the DJIA. We show that this gain/loss asymmetry established for the DJIA surprisingly
is not present in the time series of the individual stocks. The most reasonable explanation for this
fact is that the gain/loss asymmetry observed in the DJIA as well as in the SP500 and Nasdaq are due
to movements in the market as a whole, i.e., cooperative cascade processes (or “synchronization”)
which disappear in the inverse statistics of the individual stocks.
I. INTRODUCTION
What drives prices? This question has been studied for centuries with quantitative theories dating back at least to
Bachelier [4], who proposed the random walk hypothesis for price trajectories. As prices in general do not become
negative, economist later realized that a more realistic framework was obtained by assuming the random walk hypoth-
esis for the logarithm of the price [5]. This has made relative returns the prime focus of financial investigation with
only a few exceptions, such as hedge funds focusing on absolute returns, and benchmarking are almost exclusively
done by the financial community by comparing relative returns with respect to a fixed time interval.
Within the current economic paradigm — the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) [6] — the idea of randomly
fluctuating prices in the absence of new hard information has been re-formulated in the framework of hard-working
rational traders with complete knowledge of all available information whose continuing effort more or less instanta-
neously removes any imbalance in prices due to past differences in the expectations of traders. In short, the EMH
states that current prices reflect all available information about the priced commodity, i.e., all available information
is at any given instant already priced in by the market and any change in prices can only be due to the revelation of
new information. In other words, there is no free lunch.
Hence, the EMH claims that information drives prices. Unfortunately, this just leave us with another question,
namely how to price in the available information[21]? In the case of a stock, this must be done by considering how
the available information affects future earnings of the company. This obviously (again) introduces some ambiguity
as not only do peoples expectations to a largely unpredictable future differ, but so do their strategies with respect
to for example investment horizons, i.e. how long they intend to hold their investment before taking any profit, and
how large a risk they are willing to take over that time period.
In order to qualify different pricing models etc., the financial industry has performed many statistical studies
establishing a number of so-called stylized facts [8, 9, 10] as well as benchmarking for the performance of various
financial instruments with respect to investment returns and in its complement, risk taking. Due to this focus on
returns and risk, most financial studies essentially amount to measuring two-point correlations in one way or another,
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2most commonly done by studying the distribution of returns calculated over some pre-defined fixed time period
∆t [8, 9, 10].
Empirically it has been established, that for not too long time intervals ∆t’s, say less than a week, the return
distributions are characterized by “fat tails” [8, 9, 10]. Fat tails of a distribution refers to a much larger probability
for large price changes than what is to be expected from the random walk or Gaussian hypothesis. As ∆t reaches longer
time scales, the distribution of returns gradually converges to a Gaussian distribution. However, no real consensus
regarding the exact quantitative nature of this distribution exist.
¿From the point of view of the present authors, a more reasonable answer to the question of what drives prices,
besides the influence of interest rates and other macroscopic economic factors as well as quarterly earnings reports
etc. of the company in question, is human psychology with all its facets of bounded rationality, limited information,
personal beliefs etc. In accordance with this view, the economics and financial communities have in the past 5–10
years witnessed an increased interest in what has been coined “Behaviourial Economics”. A prime example of such a
study is the book by R.J. Schiller entitled “Irrational Exuberance”[22], published in 2000, but written before the crash
of April of this year [11]. This book gives numerous examples of both present (at that time) and past events where
the price of stocks, and more relevant, the P/E (price-earning-ratio) has more or less exploded based on little more
than vague notions of a “new economic era”[23] and the only real difference comes with the specific sector driving the
bubble prior to the crashes seen in the past 150 years or so.
If we focus on the US stock market, then in the 1860s and 1870s it was rail road era, in the 1920s it was utilities,
semi-conductors (“Tektronix”) influenced the development in 1950s and 1960s, in the 1980s it was a general public
investment boom driven by liberalization of the financial markets and, most recently, in second half of the 1990s it
was first an emerging market boom and then the notorious information technology bubble. Most notable are the
“explosions” in the P/E in the 1920s and in the period from early 1980s to 2000. During these periods, the P/E of
the SP500 went from about 5 to 32 and from about 7 to 45, respectively[24]. This corresponds to a more than six-fold
increase in little less that one and two decades for the two respective periods.
After the October 1987 crash, R.J. Schiller asked a number of institutional and individual investors the following
question: “Which of the following better describes your theory of the decline(s): (i) a theory about investor psychology,
or (ii) a theory about fundamentals such as profits and interest rates?” The answers revealed that about 68% of
the institutional investors and 64% of the individual investors picked the former alternative. From this R.J. Schiller
concluded that: “It appears that the stock market crash had substantially to do with a psychological feedback loop
among the general investing public from price declines to selling and thus further selling, and so forth”. This conclusion
was in accordance with his investigation of the news stories published immediately prior to the crash of October 1929
where also no specific event or events could be singled out as responsible for the crash.
¿From the point of view of human psychology, the financial communities focus on returns does not make as much
sense as one would like. The obvious answer to the question: “What return would you like to see a year from now?”,
is of course — “As large as possible!” — or, if the question concerned risk — “As small as possible!”. A more natural
investment strategy is thus to settle for some return level and/or maximum risk and then ask how long one must wait
in order to achieve this. But how is one to determine a priori this investment horizon in an utterly unpredictable
world with respect to the future some months away? Even if one solely focus on macroscopic fundamentals as well as
those of the company in question, the predictability of future earnings is a very difficult question. As J.P. Bouchaud
said in a lecture in Granada of February 2005: “I do not know how to price even my own company within a factor of
two or perhaps even three though I know everything to be known about it!”
Another, more philosophical problem, with standard models of financial markets is the following: If one, as these
models do, only assumes that the market participants are purely selfish individuals, who optimize their own utility
function through fixed time contracts with other nominally identical individuals, then, despite the achievement of
mutual benefits, the term “contract” would not be defined in a general context. Why is this so?
Because, a general and lasting definition of the term “contract” requires long-term (meaning much longer than an
ordinary human time span) institutions, which can only be upheld through non-selfish behavior. Legal institutions,
for example, have a life time of centuries and hence cannot be put to work within a framework of selfish individuals
who’s time horizon can’t possibly be longer that there own life span. Hence, most models of the financial markets
are lacking a very essential ingredient, which one usually denote by the general word “culture”. In conclusion, in our
opinion most models of the financial markets lack “psychology and culture”.
This does not mean, however, that one cannot ask what drives the economy and the stock market on longer time
scales, i.e. over decades, and what behaviour the economy exhibits over these time scales! An example of such a
study is presented on Fig. 1. Here, the historical public debt of the USA is shown together with a labeling of the most
significant historic events, mostly military conflicts, involving the US during the same period. Notice that the Korean
War and it’s formal UN-forces did not represent any significant increase in US public debt. However, the so-called
Cold War between the USA and the USSR most certainly did. It is clear that the over-all rise in the public debt is
exponential driven by large “bumps” signifying rapid increases in public debt.
3It is striking, on a qualitative level, that the origin of these large increases in US public debt is simply related to
war with two major exceptions; the purchase of the Louisiana Territory from Napoleon in 1803 on the unauthorized
initiative of the US-ambassador in Paris, and the Keynesian (in the meaning massive public investments) “New Deal”
of Roosevelt in the 1930s. Note, that the logarithmic scale is the reason why the “bumps” belonging to the purchase
of the Louisiana Territory and the Spanish War of 1898 do not “stand out” in Fig. 1.
If one compares this figure with one of the US stock market, say, the DJIA (Figs. 2) one clearly sees that on a
qualitative level the rises in the public debt, due to wars and New Deal, are followed by steep rises in the stock market
with one big exception, namely the bubble of the 1920s. In hind-sight, this may not be so surprising, since increases in
public debt normally means large public spending which funnels large amounts into the private sector. However, one
should note that the average growth rate of the US public debt is about 8.6%, see Fig. 1. This should be compared
with that of the DJIA until the 1950s, which is about 2.5%. What is surprising is that most time periods with peace
exhibit a significant decline in the public debt, most notably the period after the war of 1812 until the second war
with the Seminole Indians (1835–1842), as well as modest growth in the DJIA. In the first half of the 19th century,
the US public debt dropped to a meager US$ 33.733 in 1835 from US$ 75.463.477 in 1791[25]. In conclusion with
respect to long-term growth in the stock market, public spending, especially in the case of war, has played a very
significant role in the long-term growth of the US economy and hence of the DJIA.
In the next sections, we will turn to the subject of optimal investments horizon distributions for both individual
stocks as well as markets. We will do this in order to qualify an answer to the previous questions re-formulated as
“what a return is reasonable to expect in x days from now” for both individual stocks as well as markets by considering
the gain distribution for pre-defined return levels. In order to quantify the risk from historical data, we also consider
the corresponding loss distribution[26].
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we turn to the short-term behaviour
of three US stock markets, namely the DJIA, the SP500 and the Nasdaq. Here, we will re-introduce a conceptually
new framework for the analysis of short-term (in the sense of days and weeks) price fluctuations. We call this tool
of analysis for inverse statistics as we fix the return level and let time float, and not vice versa, as in the usual
return statistics. (It is worth noting that an analysis, where both return level and time floats conditioned on a stable
trend in either direction has been published by the first author [13, 14]). First, we re-visit previous results for the
DJIA as well as presenting new results for the SP500 and the Nasdaq index, showing that the distribution of time
horizons needed to obtain a specified return can be excellently parameterized by a generalized gamma-distribution.
Such distributions are well-known from various first-passage problem [15], but the quality of this parametrization is
nevertheless surprising considering the nature of the data. We then turn to the previously found gain/loss asymmetry
for the DJIA [2] and show that a similar asymmetry is present in both the SP500 and Nasdaq. In the third section,
we turn to the use of the inverse statistics on the single stocks that are included in the DJIA in order to further
investigate the origin of this gain/loss asymmetry. Surprisingly, we find that the gain/loss asymmetry obtained for
the index vanishes for the individual stocks. The last section concludes arguing that the gain/loss asymmetry found
in the index comes from a cooperative cascade through the various sectors of the economy represented in the DJIA.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
In resent publications [1, 2, 3, 16], the present authors have proposed to invert the standard return-distribution
problem and instead study the probability distribution of waiting times needed to reach a fixed level of return ρ
for the first time (see also Ref. [17]). As mentioned previously, this is in the literature known as the “first passage
time”-problem [15] and the solution is known analytically for a Brownian motion as the Gamma-distribution
p(t) = |a| exp(−a
2/t)√
pit3/2
, (1)
(with a ∝ ρ), where one for large (waiting) times recovers the well-known first return probability for a random walk
p(t) ∼ t−3/2.
Historical financial time series such as the DJIA, SP500 and Nasdaq possesses an (often close to exponential, see
however [18]) positive drift over long time scales due to the overall growth of the economy modulated with times of
recession, wars etc. If such a drift is present in the analyzed time series, one can obviously not compare directly the
empirical probability distribution for positive and negative levels of return. As the focus of the present paper will
be on such a comparison, we must eliminate or at least significantly reduce the effect of this drift. One possibility
for detrending the data is to use so-called deflated asset prices, but such prices are calculated using certain economic
assumptions, which we as physicists are naturally suspicious of.
In the present study as well as in those of [1, 2], we have instead chosen to remove the drift based on the use of
wavelets [19, 20], which has the advantages of being non-parametric. This technique has been described in detail
4elsewhere [1] and for the present purpose, it suffices to say that this wavelet technique enables a separation of the
original time series s(t) into a short scale (detrended) time series s˜(t) and a (long time-scale) drift term d(t) so that
s(t) = s˜(t) + d(t) (cf. Fig. 2(c)).
Based on s˜(t) for some historical time period of the DJIA, the empirical investment horizon distributions, p(τρ),
needed to obtain a pre-defined return level ρ for the first time can easily be calculated for different ρ’s. As s˜(t) is
stationary over time scales beyond that of the applied wavelet (for a time larger than say 1000 days) it is straightforward
to compare positive and negative levels of return.
As the empirical logarithmic stock price process is known not to be Brownian, we have suggested to use a generalized
(shifted) Gamma distribution
p(t) =
ν
Γ
(
α
ν
) |β|2α
(t+ t0)α+1
exp
{
−
(
β2
t+ t0
)ν }
, (2)
where the reasons behind t0 are purely technical[27].
The results so far have been very encouraging with respect to excellent parametrization of the empirical probability
distributions for three major stock markets, namely DJIA, SP500 and Nasdaq; cf. Figs. 3(a), 4(a) and 5 for examples
using a return level of 5% and the figure captions for values of the fit parameters. The choice of ρ = ±0.05 is not
accidental. It is sufficiently large to be above the “noise level” quantified by the historical volatility and sufficiently
small to be of quite frequently occurrence. We have also considered other return levels, showing qualitatively the
same features, but there results are not shown.
In all three cases, the tail-exponents α+ 1 of the distributions parameterized by Eq. (2) are indistinguishable from
the “random walk value” of 3/2, which is not very surprising. What is both surprising and very interesting is that
these three major US stock markets (DJIA, SP500 and Nasdaq) exhibit a very distinct gain/loss asymmetry, i.e., the
distributions are not invariant to a change of sign in the return ρ (Figs. 3(a), 4(a) and 5). Furthermore, this gain/loss
asymmetry quantified by the optimal investment horizon defined as the peak position of the distributions has for at
least the DJIA a surprisingly simple asymptotically power law like relationship with the return level ρ, see Fig. 6.
See Ref. [16] for an application of inverse statistics to high-frequency foreign exchange data, specifically the US$
against the Deutch Mark and the Japanese Yen. We are also currently investigating the use of inverse statistics for
intra-day stock prices, but the results so far are still preliminary.
III. NEW RESULTS
As mentioned previously, the purpose of the present paper is to further investigate the origin of the gain/loss asym-
metry in DJIA. We do that by simply comparing the gain and loss distributions of the DJIA with the corresponding
distributions for a single stocks in the DJIA as well as their average.
An obvious problem with this approach is that the stocks in the DJIA changes with historical period and hence
an exact correspondence between the DJIA and the single stocks in the DJIA is difficult to obtain if one at the same
time wants good statistics. This is the trade-off, where we have put the emphasis on good statistics. However, if this
choice produces interpretational difficulties, then one must ask why analyze the historical DJIA at all?
The 21 company stocks analyzed and presently in the DJIA (by the change of April 2004) are listed in table I
together with the their date of entry into the DJIA as the time period of the data set analyzed.
As previously mentioned, the empirical distributions for ρ = ±0.05 are presented in Figs. 3(a), 4(a) and 5 for the
DJIA, the SP500 and the Nasdaq respectively for the entire time span available to the authors. Furthermore, in
Figs. 3(b) and 4(b) we have truncated the full data sets of the DJIA and SP500 to a shorter historical time period
in order to compare the results for the indices with that of the individual stocks. What one should primarily note in
the comparison between the two sets of figures, i.e., the longer data sets with the shorter, is that the only significant
difference is to be found in the weaker statistics of the shorter periods; the positions of the maxima for the positive
and the negative gains are in both cases roughly just below 10 and 20 days, respectively, i.e., a difference of roughly
a factor of 2 for all three indices for a return level of 5%.
In Figs. 7 we show the waiting time distributions for 4 companies in the DJIA, which are representative for the
distributions obtained for all the companies listed in Table I. We see that, for a return level |ρ| = 0.05, the value of
the optimal investment horizon, i.e. the position of the peak in the distribution, ranges from around 2 days to around
10 days depending on the company. More importantly, it is clear from just looking at the figures that, within the
statistical precision of the data, the distributions are the same for positive and negative values of ρ.
In order to further quantify this invariance with respect to the sign of ρ, we have averaged the (company) gain and
loss distributions separately in order to obtain an average behavior for the stocks listed in Table I. The result of this
averaging process (Fig. 8) is nothing less that an almost perfect agreement between the gain and loss distributions with
5a peak position around 5 days for both distributions. This means that the optimal investment horizon for the average
of these selected individual stocks is approximately half that of the loss distribution for the DJIA and approximately
one fourth of that for the gain distribution. In other words, it is twice as slow to move the DJIA down and four times
as slow to move the DJIA up compared to the average time to move an individual stock in the DJIA up or down.
How can we rationalize these results? What we have done in essence is to interchange the operations of averaging
over the stocks in the DJIA and calculating the inverse statistics for the stocks of this index. Since the DJIA is
constructed such that it covers all sectors of the economy of which it seems quite reasonable to assume that a 5%
gain/loss in the shares of for example Boeing Airways in general has nothing fundamentally to do with a corresponding
gain/loss in the shares of Coca-Cola Company especially since the data are detrended. In other words, it seems quite
reasonable to assume that there is nothing special about a return level of 5% in terms of economic fundamentals etc.
This assumption is also strongly supported by the results presented in Fig. 6.
This then means that the two operations, i.e. the averaging and the inverse statistics calculation, do not commute
not even approximately. Hence significant inter-stock correlations must exist even for a rather modest return level
ρ = 0.05. In our view, this is a quite surprising result and especially considering that the large differences in the
optimal investment horizons for the distributions of the index and the average of the individual stocks.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have considered inverse statistics for financial data. It is argued that the natural candidate for such statistics
is what we call the investment horizon distribution. Such a distribution, obtained from the historic data of a given
market, indicates the time span an investor historically has to wait in order to obtain a predefined level of return. For
the three major US markets, namely the DJIA, SP500 and Nasdaq, the distributions are parametrized excellently by
a shifted generalized Gamma distributions for which the first moment does not exist.
The typical waiting time, for a given level of return ρ, can therefore be characterized by e.g. the time position
of the maximum of the distribution which we call the optimal investment horizon. By studying the behaviour of
this quantity for positive (gain) and negative (loss) levels of return, a very interesting and pronounced gain/loss
asymmetry emerges for all three markets considered. The nature of this gain/loss asymmetry was further investigated
by calculating the investment horizon distribution for 21 of the 30 individual stocks in the DJIA. Quite surprisingly
the observed gain/loss asymmetry in the DJIA is not present in the investment horizon distribution for the individual
stocks.
Specifically, we have shown that if one first “average” the stock prices of, say, the DJIA in order to create the index
and then calculate the inverse statistics of it, then one obtains a pronounced gain/loss asymmetry. Reversing the order
of these two operations, however, makes this asymmetry disappear. Admittedly, this has been done systematically for
only a single gain and loss level ρ, but it seems unreasonable to claim anything special about the 5% gain/loss level
used. Hence, the investment horizon distribution for the individual stocks is invariant under a change of sign for ρ.
Furthermore, the optimal investment horizon for the average of the distributions for the individual stocks is ap-
proximately half that of the loss distribution for the entire market (DJIA) and approximately one fourth of that for
the gain distribution for the entire market. In other words, it is twice as slow to move the DJIA down and four times
as slow to move the DJIA up compared to the average time to move an individual stock in the DJIA up or down.
There are several possible scenarios which may explain the observed behavior. However, they all amount to more
or less the same thing. A down/up-turn in the DJIA may be initiated by a down/up-turn in some particular stock in
some particular economical sector. This is followed by a down/up-turn in economically related stocks in other sectors
and so forth. The result is a cascade, or synchronization, of consecutive down/up-turns in all the sectors covered by
the DJIA. The initiation of this may be some more general new piece of information, which is considered more crucial
for one sector than other sectors, but as argued for in length in [11] it may also happen for no obvious reason what
so ever.
An (rational) example would be that Intel drops significantly due to bad quarterly earnings in turn, by a cascade
process, affecting the stock price of IBM and MicroSoft and so forth. As the index, at least from a physicist’s point of
view, can be compared to an external field, movements in the index due to a single or a few stocks can rapidly spread
through most or all sectors, if psychology in general and specifically feed-back loops are important, thus creating a
relatively large movements in the over-all index. That losses in general are faster than gains must also be attributed
to human psychology: people are in general much more risk adverse than risk taking[28].
In conclusion, the results presented here thus provide further evidence for the presence of cooperative behavior (or
synchronization) possibly with a psychological origin in the stock market beyond what can be deduced from standard
financial models.
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7Company Entering date Data period
Alcoa⋆ Apr 22, 1959 1962.1–1999.8
American Express Company Aug 30, 1982 1977.2–1999.8
ATT† Mar 14, 1939 1984.1–1999.8
Boeing Airways Jul 08, 1986 1962.1–1999.8
Citicorp• Mar 17, 1997 1977.0–1999.8
Coca-Cola Company Mar 12, 1987 1970.0–1999.8
DuPont Nov 20, 1935 1962.1–1999.8
Exxon & Mobil◦ Oct 01, 1928 1970.0–1999.8
General Electric Nov 07, 1907 1970.0–1999.8
General Motors Mar 16, 1915 1970.0–1999.8
Goodyear July 18 1930 1970.1–1999.8
Hewlett & Packard Mar 17, 1997 1977.0–1999.8
IBM Jun 29, 1979 1962.0–1999.8
Intel Nov 01, 1999 1986.5–1999.8
International Paper Jul 03, 1956 1970.1–1999.8
Eastman Kodak Company Jul 18, 1930 1962.0–1999.8
McDonald’s Cooperation Oct 30, 1985 1970.1–1999.8
Merck & Company Jun 29, 1979 1970.0–1999.8
Procter & Gamble May 26, 1932 1970.0–1999.8
The Walt Disney Co. May 06, 1991 1962.0–1999.8
Wall Mart Mar 17, 1997 1972.7–1999.8
TABLE I: List of the (21) DJIA stocks analyzed in this work (about 70% of the total number). Furthermore, their date of
entry into the DJIA are shown, and the time period covered by the analyzed data set. All of these companies are also naturally
part of SP500 with General Electric as the most heavily weighted stock.⋆Former Aluminum Corporation of America. †Former
American Tel. & Tel. Truncated due to anti-trust case in 1984. •Former Travelers Group. ◦Former Standard Oil.
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FIG. 1: Graph of the historical US public debt from 1791 till 2000. The dashed diagonal line represents an exponential function
corresponding to an average growth rate of about 8.6%. Some historic events are marked by dashed vertical lines in the figure.
They are: (a) the 1812 war (1812–1814); (b) the second war with the Seminole Indians (1835–1842); (c) The Mexican-American
War (1846–1848); (d) The Civil War (1861–1865); (e) The Spanish American War (1898); (f) The First World War (1914–1918);
(g) The Second World War (1940–1945) (h) The Cold War (1947–1991).
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FIG. 2: Historic DJIA data: (a) 1810–1902; (b) 1900–1950; (c) 1896–2001 including the (wavelet) detrended data series, s˜(t),
analyzed below (cf. Ref. [1] for further details).
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(a) DJIA (1896.5–2001.7)
1 10 100 1000
τρ [days]
0.0000
0.0025
0.0050
0.0075
0.0100
0.0125
p(
τ ρ
)
ρ= 0.05
ρ=-0.05
(b) DJIA (1960.8–1999.8)
FIG. 3: Inverse statistics for detrended closing prices (open symbols) of the DJIA for the time periods indicated. For all
cases the return levels used were |ρ| = 0.05. The solid lines represent the best fits of Eq. ((2) to the empirical data with the
parameters indicated below; (a) DJIA (1896.5–2001.7): α ≈ 0.51, β ≈ 5.23, ν ≈ 0.68 and t0 ≈ 0.42 (loss distribution); α ≈ 0.51,
β ≈ 4.53, ν ≈ 2.13 and t0 ≈ 10.1 (gain distribution); (b) Same as Fig. 3(a), but for a shorter time period (1960.8–1999.8). Note
that the tail exponents α+ 1 are very close to the “random walk value” of 3/2 for all distributions.
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(a) SP500 (1940.9–2000.3)
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FIG. 4: Inverse statistics for detrended closing prices (open symbols) of the SP500 for the time periods indicated. For all cases
the return levels used were |ρ| = 0.05. The solid lines represent the best fits of Eq. (2) to the empirical data with the following
parameters: (a) SP500 1940.9–2000.3): α ≈ 0.50, β ≈ 4.87, ν ≈ 0.88 and t0 ≈ 1.59(loss distribution); α ≈ 0.50, β ≈ 5.10,
ν ≈ 2.56 and t0 ≈ 14.0 (gain distribution); (b) Same as Fig. 4(a), but for a shorter time period (1960.8–1999.8). Note that the
tail exponents α+ 1 are very close to the “random walk value” of 3/2 for all distributions.
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FIG. 5: Same as Fig. 3(a), but for the Nasdaq. The historical time period considered is 1971.2 to 2004.6. Again he solid
lines represent fit of the empirical data against Eq. (2) with parameters: α ≈ 0.51, β ≈ 4.72, ν ≈ 0.73 and t0 ≈ 7.92 (loss
distribution); α ≈ 0.51, β ≈ 4.16, ν ≈ 2.41 and t0 ≈ 0.07 (gain distribution). Note again that the tail exponents α+1 are very
close to the “random walk value” of 3/2 for both distributions.
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FIG. 6: The optimal investment horizon τ∗ρ for positive (open circles) and negative (open squares) levels of return ±ρ for the
DJIA. In the case where ρ < 0 one has used −ρ on the abscissa for reasons of comparison. If a geometrical Brownian price
process is assumed, one will have τ∗ρ ∼ ρ
γ with γ = 2 for all values of ρ. Such a scaling behaviour is indicated by the lower
dashed line in the graph. Empirically one finds γ ≃ 1.8 (upper dashed line), only for large values of the return.
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(a) Boeing Airways
1 10 100 1000
τρ [days]
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
p(
τ ρ
)
ρ= 0.05
ρ=-0.05
(b) General Electric
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(c) General Motors
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FIG. 7: Same as Fig. 3(a), but for some of the individual companies of the DJIA: (a) Boeing Airways (1962.1–1999.8); (b)
General Electric (1970.0–1999.8); (c) General Motors (1970.0–1999.8); (d) Exxon & Mobil, former Standard Oil (1970.0–1999.8).
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FIG. 8: Averaged gain and loss distribution for the companies listed in table I. The fit is Eq. (2) with values α ≈ 0.60,
β ≈ 3.24, ν ≈ 0.94 and t0 ≈ 1.09. Note that the tail exponent α+ 1 is 0.1 above the “random walk value” of 3/2.
